Since a crisis is a shock impinging on a system, the response can be used to deduce aspects of the system's structure. 
Introduction
India's opening out coincided with a period of major global crises. The institutional changes that opened out a closed economy were the background in which fiscal and monetary policy had to respond to external shocks and domestic cycles while maintaining trend higher growth with low inflation and ensuring fiscal sustainability.
India itself did not have a financial crisis although growth became volatile. There were clear benefits such as trend higher growth rate, and emergence of new growth foci. Growth was no longer government driven. But were these outcomes due to good luck or good policy? Was policy able to smooth cycles and external shocks or did it magnify them? How did it deal with policy trilemmas created by a more open capital account? What improvements does the experience of crisis and exit suggest for shortand long-term policy strategies? The paper analyzes the fiscal and monetary policy combination, the extent of stabilization, and suggests exit strategies that would benefit India while contributing to global adjustment.
Policies were procyclical in the early reform years, but the response to global crisis has demonstrated the effectiveness of countercyclical macroeconomic policies, while making clear the importance of supply-side factors for Indian inflation and of demand for output. During exit, early resurgence of inflation before recovery was well established created problems for policy. Action consistent with structure and shocks can increase growth yet reduce inflation, exchange rate regimes can contribute to these objectives, while reducing risk taking and dealing with surges of capital. The paper also analyzes other ways in which the shocks of opening out can be handled before concluding with an analysis of fiscal sustainability.
Policy recommendations include further fine-tuning stabilization policies. Short-run strategies include early, forward-looking, and therefore mild, policy responses. Instead of relying solely on reducing demand to bring down inflation, a supply-side policy that reduces costs is an announced conditional adjustment path to anchor inflationary expectations and prevent the second-round wage-price effects. Exchange rate appreciation is another monetary measure. Short-term fiscal measures include taxtariff rates, freer imports, and better management of food stocks. If policy created shocks work in the opposite direction to temporary supply shocks they may abort inflation, even while demand is stabilized. More flexibility of the exchange rate allows a smoother and more counter-cyclical interest rate. Its contribution to lowering inflation increases the Central Bank's ability to adapt interest rates to the domestic cycle Longer-term strategies to reduce the distortions that create chronic inflation, include raising agricultural productivity, improving infrastructure and delivery of public services. Gradual but transparent movement towards capital account convertibility has to deepen domestic markets and risk-taking ability before allowing riskier types of foreign capital inflows. Growth will improve the fiscal position provided reforms ensure the necessary quantity and quality of expenditure for alleviating supply side bottlenecks. Incentives to improve compliance, such as selective expenditure caps and targets for individual ministries as part of better accounting and management systems are required. Caps imply countercyclical deficits as revenue falls in bad times.
Temporary widening of the current account deficit would support India's investment cycle. Short-term exchange rate appreciation would reduce inflationary pressures and the cost of imports required in the high investment phase, while contributing to demand in other countries facing a slowdown. Countries that help finance Indian infrastructure would be benefiting from Indian growth that creates demand for their own products. Reforms in the global financial architecture would reduce the necessity of self-insurance and the cost of engaging with the world, and enable faster liberalization. High transitional growth looks feasible for India but an appropriate fiscal and monetary framework can ensure it is stable and sustainable.
Crisis and Exit
This episode has faulted two myths that the media and mainstream analysts propagate about the Indian macroeconomy. Namely: inflation always indicates capacity constraints, and rising deficits are always a major risk. It is important to point this out because the same myths are reviving with the economy. Table 1 shows the sharp monetary tightening raising short rates above 9 percent in the summer of 2008 precipitated a collapse in industrial output even before the September fall of Lehman. The tightening came after a period of high growth. The economy was feared to be overheating and inflation, following the international spike in fuel and food, was high. A demand shock, with a near vertical supply curve should affect inflation more than output. But the reverse happened. The wholesale price index (WPI) did not fall until November when Indian fuel prices fell, but the consumer price index remained high. The V shaped recovery also indicates a reduction in demand rather than more intractable destruction of capacity. The rise in government consumption compensated for the fall in private consumption and investment, and contributed to the quick recovery. An expanding fiscal deficit made this possible. Countercyclical movement in deficits is compatible with overall fiscal consolidation.
The episode also countered the belief that demand is interest inelastic in India, and output is supply determined. The impact of recently freed interest rates on elasticities, in particular on consumer durable spending, housing, etc.
was not yet fully internalized. The table shows only a short lag from policy rates to industry; 2-3 quarters for a fall and one quarter for a sharp rise. Policy rates have impacted output growth since 1996. The table also shows a 3-4 quarter lag of policy rates on gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), while the revival of foreign inflows had an almost immediate impact on both industry and capital formation. The rise in exports followed the industrial recovery.
There are two types of errors made. The first assumes the final goal applies now so mature economy macroeconomic concepts can be uncritically applied to India. The second that nothing has changed so new policy instruments do not work.
Macroeconomic policy had largely aggravated the effects of shocks rather than moderated them. But following the global demand push showed us that countercyclical macroeconomic policy was feasible and it worked. The RBI was able to manage higher government borrowings to limit crowding out of private borrowing, for example through preponing government borrowing in the period of slack private demand.
The crisis response was fast but the resurgence of inflation before recovery was firmly established led to policy dilemmas regarding exit. The response to early signs of industrial inflation was delayed, given the very large cut in interest rates that had to be reversed. The delay led to too fast a pace of increase in interest rates 1 and to quantitative tightening. The latter contributed to volatility in interest rates and in industrial output. As elasticities increase and systems because more complex, blunt instruments can be phased out, or policies designed to reduce sharp changes. Policy better based on structure and shocks could more successfully smooth cycles and maintain growth.
Structure and Shocks
Mainstream macroeconomic analysis is adapted to a modern economy. Issues relating to the large informal sector, which still accounts for the major share of employment, are relegated to development economics. But once a populous emerging market crosses a critical threshold and high catch-up growth is established, higher labour mobility blurs the distinction between formal and informal sectors. A macroeconomics of the aggregate economy becomes both necessary and feasible.
Consider the Indian case. Aggregate labour supply is elastic as a large labour force shifts to more productive occupations. Higher productivity releases labour from traditional occupations, and the demographic profile ensures a steady stream of youthful entrants to the work force. Improvements in education supply, and more important, the returns to acquiring an education, ensure that new entrants have adequate skills. Higher per capita income growth with sticky consumption habits and a larger share of earners raises aggregate savings, financial deepening improves intermediation of savings, and freer capital inflows complement domestic savings.
Therefore finance is no longer a constraint.
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So the modern NKE apparatus (Woodford, 2003) , which takes labour as the input into aggregate production, and allows specific distortions to be included, can be used. The major distortion to be modeled, for an emerging market (EM) like India, is the dualistic labour market. Capital is not a binding constraint since it is a produced means of production. Therefore the longer-run aggregate supply (LAS) is elastic ( Figure 1 ). But such an economy is subject to inefficiencies, distortions and cost shocks. These tend to push aggregate supply upwards, but over an entire range, rather than only at full employment, since that is not reached at current output ranges and output can increase. The LAS becomes vertical only as the economy matures and full productive employment is reached.
The food price wage cycle is an important mechanism propagating price shocks and creating inflationary expectations in India, given low per capita incomes, and the large share of food in the consumption basket. Political pressures from farmers push up farm support prices, with consumption subsidies also going up. But these are inadequate due to corruption and failures of targeting, so nominal wages rise with a lag pushing up costs and generating second round inflation from a temporary supply shock. This political economy indexes wages informally to food price inflation.
Political support also raises wages through minimum wages and employment Calibration of exit based on this structure would include early mild tightening signaling further response as required to anchor inflationary expectations and prevent the second-round wage-price effects without a sharp demand contraction. This is an example of successful anticipation and prevention given knowledge of structure and behaviour. Instead of relying solely on reducing demand to bring down inflation, both short-term monetary and fiscal policies should shift down the supply curve. For example, exchange rate appreciation, or fiscal measures such as tax-tariff rates, and freer imports. Policy created shocks working in the opposite direction to temporary supply shocks could abort inflation. Longer-term strategies to reduce distortions that create an upward creep in the supply curve, include raising agricultural productivity, changing the composition and effectiveness of public spending, improving infrastructure and delivery of public services.
Since the exchange rate regime can contribute to the above, to managing capital flows, and to coordination of the global exit, we examine it in more detail in the next section.
The Exchange Rate Regime
There has been considerable evolution in India's exchange rate regime over the reform years. The shift has been from a nominal fix to one-way movement over the nineties to two-way with low volatility implying a tightly managed exchange rate, to greater volatility and nominal movement after the global crisis ( Figure 2 ).
Concerns to prevent appreciation in the context of a trade deficit, large but volatile inflows, and higher Indian inflation led to reserve accumulation, a tendency for nominal depreciation, and relative constancy of the real exchange rate around the real effective exchange rate (REER) established after the double devaluation in the early nineties.
But theory (Cordon, 2002 , Svensson, 2000 suggests the exchange rate regime can aid other policy objectives in addition to encouraging exports and contributing to macroeconomic stabilization. It can neutralize inflationary commodity shocks, and reduce the risk taking that leads to a currency crisis. With more two-way short-term variation, more objectives can be accommodated, through more sophisticated strategies.
The average daily turnover in Indian foreign exchange (FX) markets had the fastest world growth rate from about US $3. Even so, development helped the economy absorb much larger movements in capital and reserve changes in the global crisis compared to the East Asian crisis with a smaller growth contraction (Table 2 ). This time the interest rate defense was not used-more exchange rate flexibility was accepted. The rise in policy rates in 2008 was more in response to food and oil price shocks. It preceded the outflow-induced depreciation, and was reversed when outflows started.
After the immediate crisis, the RBI intervened less 3 , letting capital flows affect the exchange rate. The guiding hand deserted the markets. Swings in nominal and real exchange rates exceeded ten percent. Intervention may have been lower in order to conserve reserves at a time of great uncertainty, as the fear of floating gave way to a fear of reserve depletion, and also because reviving inflows more or less matched a widening current account deficit. But the resulting changes in the exchange rate were often opposite to what was required for macro stabilization. India cannot as yet let capital flows determine the exchange rate as a full float under capital account convertibility would imply. But the middle ground is large, and more flexibility is feasible. In the exit, since Indian inflation is higher than in the rest of the world, short-term appreciation can import low inflation at the same time increasing export demand from other countries and increasing their output. By reducing the need for a sharp rise in interest rates it will help maintain higher Indian growth, and contribute to world demand. Otherwise the inflation differential will anyway cause a real appreciation. Depreciation can follow, depending on the current account balance, after inflation subsides. Recovering world demand would help India reduce its trade deficit. In addition, active non-price polices, including diversification of destinations, could encourage exports.
The exchange rate has the shortest lag among monetary policy transmission channels.
Oil dominates India's imports. Since these are quoted in dollars pass through of the exchange rate is high. As border prices begin to affect domestic food prices, the exchange rate also becomes important for the domestic political economy. Some agricultural liberalization and falling world food prices in the nineties did reduce political pressures on procurement prices. Inflation fell. Since appreciation following an adverse supply shock lowers intermediate goods and food prices, it pre-empts the effect of temporary supply shocks on the domestic price-wage process. Lower food price inflation would reduce the necessity for subsidies and administered prices that distort incentives and lower efficiency. Building in a rule whereby there is an automatic response to a supply shock avoids the tendency to do nothing until it becomes necessary to over-react. Actions linked to exogenous shocks also avoid moral hazard.
Such nominal changes can counter temporary shocks. But permanent shocks require productivity improvements. Without a rise in productivity, inflation would add real to the nominal appreciation, requiring nominal depreciation to correct overvaluation.
Some exchange rate volatility also forces hedging to reduce currency risk. As risk taking reduces so does the probability of currency crises. But too predictable or unidirectional movements encourage speculative positions. Despite steady reforms in Indian foreign exchange (FX) markets and some two-way rupee movement, firms lost a lot of money from bets on a trend appreciation when the global financial crisis led to large depreciation. Movement in a 10 band is sufficient to make such positions unattractive since potential losses from an incorrect position become large. Volatile movements above that level invite excessive entry of uninformed traders and below that level reduce the risk to speculative one-way bets on the exchange rate. So a plus minus five percent band is the volatility level a managed float should aim at.
Limited volatility is consistent with maintaining a trend competitive real effective exchange rate. There is evidence such volatility does not have a large effect on trade while currency crises adversely affect trade. If crises are avoided, interest rates lowered, and the exchange rate kept near competitive rates, trade is benefited.
Free capital flows and a fixed exchange rate make monetary policy ineffective since it is tied to maintaining the fixed exchange rate. The domestic interest rate must equal the international rate since any policy induced departure would lead to a flood of inflows and in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate policy must absorb the inflows, changing money supply in the process until the domestic interest rate is back in alignment with the international rate. For example, buying dollars to prevent appreciation when dollars flood in, if the domestic short interest rate exceeds the US interest rate, raises money supply and reduces the domestic interest rate. The incompatibility of independent monetary policy with free capital flows and a fixed exchange rate is known as the impossible trinity. Since the interest rate also has to cover expected depreciation it becomes volatile. Relative variation in nominal interest exceeded that in exchange rates initially following reforms. In the nineties, the volatility of capital flows was less than that of the current account deficit implying policy instead of smoothing shocks from openness magnified them. More flexibility of the exchange rate allows a smoother and more counter-cyclical interest rate. Its contribution to lowering inflation increases the Central Bank's ability to adapt interest rates to the domestic cycle.
Sequenced capital account restrictions and flexible exchange rates help to navigate the trinity and retain some degrees of freedom for monetary policy. That capital flows were never able to close the large differential between domestic and foreign interest rates in India suggests these degrees of freedom existed.
Capital Account Restrictions
Private Foreign Investments 4 have many benefits. But especially in EMs they are subject to sudden stops or reversals. These could be due to external shocks or to infectious panics unrelated to fundamentals. India's policy strategy of "middling through" helped to reduce these risks and manage the surges. Liberalization of the capital account distinguished between types and direction of flows and was much greater for equity compared to debt flows including bank loans, and for foreign compared to domestic residents. Among debt flows long-term debt was to be liberalized before short-term. The rationale was equity, in contrast to debt, shares in and therefore reduces liabilities in a crisis. Inflows have to be allowed to go out if they are to come in, but continuing restrictions on domestic capital outflows can reduce the reserve cover required. Reversible volatile inflows were largely accumulated as reserves-a costly form of self-insurance.
Research and empirical estimation has found that only countries with strong domestic institutions, markets and government finances benefit from foreign inflows. These features determine absorptive capacity that reduces volatility and also gives countries the ability to withstand volatility. Thus the Indian strategy followed a well thought out sequence whereby full capital account liberalization was to come after deepening domestic markets, and improving government finances. Liberalizing, deepening markets and improving institutions and policy form a package. One alone is dangerous without the others. Strict sequencing is also necessary. The crisis showed that improvement in the international financial architecture and regulation are also preconditions for full capital account liberalization.
There is a perspective that regards any departure from full liberalization as a failure of reforms. But it is beginning to be recognized that it is actually a better strategy of liberalization. Lobbyists who want free foreign entry without the other harder preconditions would put the country to unnecessary risk.
Partial capital convertibility gives flexibility along the line of control, making selective tightening feasible if necessary. Additional instruments become available to tackle the policy trilemma. For example, stricter end use criteria were imposed for firms bringing funds in during periods of excessive inflows.
The strategy paid off as India avoided East European-type crisis due to excessive entry and loan pushing by banks. Despite higher volatility in narrow markets, the FPI inflows benefited firms. Loans became easier to get and more venture capital entered.
Higher equity inflows were associated with higher level of domestic investment. But households did not benefit. Retail participation shrank in volatile markets. Thus foreign entry cannot resolve all problems. Other conditions also have to be in place.
Eventual internationalization of Indian financial services is required as Indian companies go global. But the sequencing has to be correct. Better intermediation of the high domestic savings ratios would make markets more stable.
The Indian debt market is underdeveloped. There is zero retail participation, and caps on foreign rupee debt funds. Banks are forced to hold the large government debt through high statutory liquidity requirements (SLR). This must be brought down and more government debt held by households in a domestic retail market as a first step.
The Greece sovereign debt crisis, and the post crisis explosion in government debts, suggests that risks associated with excessive external holding of sovereign debt will be large. India is not yet ready to face high interest volatility. Fiscal consolidation is a precondition and will be analyzed in the next section.
Sustainable Debt and Fiscal Reform
In the beginning stages of the global crisis India was regarded as high-risk because high government debt and deficit ratios limited the scope for fiscal stimulus. In the event the stimulus worked and it was one of the first countries to resume fiscal consolidation. A concept of counter cyclical deficits or cyclically adjusted fiscal balance is required.
The perception of risky deficits extrapolates unconditionally from Latin American crises, where savings rates and population densities were low, and sovereign debt was held abroad. But Indian private savings are high enough to cover for some government dissaving, thus preventing a large current account deficit and potential currency crises. Like in Japan, where the debt ratios are more than double Indian, the debt is held internally. Moreover, once high catch-up growth is established in a populous country, with a demographic profile that ensures sustained entry of youthful workers, the denominator increases so deficit and debt ratios reduce. Government expenditure that increases the supply response is sustainable. Higher growth also contributes more revenues 5 . Average Indian nominal interest rates exceed international and have been falling, while Indian inflation tends to be higher. A lower real interest rate means lower interest payment on past debt so lower additions to expenditures and therefore deficits. The section below demonstrates these aspects formally.
Deficits and the evolution of Government debt
The maturity value of nominal government debt B t P t , changes over time as follows:
BB t is the maturity value of real public debt; real government purchases are G t and nominal net tax collections are T t so that real tax collections are 
Gives:
That is, the evolution of the real debt ratio. The latter rises with the debt level, nominal interest rate, and primary deficit ratio (pd) or the excess of real government expenditure over taxation as a ratio to output. Therefore high debt levels can imply exploding unsustainable debt. Falling real interest rates and rising growth rates effectively reduce government debt. Inflation and growth rates do not affect the nominal value of public debt, B t P t , which increases in any year by nominal interest payments on debt plus the PD, P t G t -T t. The latter is the non-interest budget deficit, while the fiscal deficit (FD) includes interest payments and is the total governmentborrowing requirement to finance current and capital expenditure net of tax and nontax revenue. The revenue deficit (RD), or deficit on current account, is the amount the government needs to borrow to finance its own consumption. If the real interest rate equals the rate of growth, the PD ratio alone would add to the debt ratio. Figure 4 shows how the Indian debt and pd has tended to fall in periods of high growth, and rise when inflation has been low and real interests high. But the fall was more convincing in the mid-nineties than it was in the mid 2000s when B actually kept rising, ending in a sharp spike in government borrowing. Goyal (2011b) allows high transitional growth in a populous low per capita income EM to reduce debt ratios as in equation (4) Although reforms aimed to improve fiscal health, the norm of political populism sought inclusion through short-term transfers. The FRBM Act was not designed to protect investment, so productive expenditure was cut to continue populist spending.
The former would have improved human, social, and physical capital, and therefore the supply response. The FRBM legislation brought down only reported deficits. But the global shock exposed the inadequate attention paid to incentives and escape clauses in formulating the Act. Loopholes were used to maintain the letter of the law even while violating its spirit. There is ongoing improvement on the tax side. Apart from buoyancy due to higher growth, there were reforms in tax administration such as TIN, a proposed shift to GST and a new Direct Tax Code. If the composition of fiscal expenditure changes to improve the supply response, monetary policies can also support cyclical adjustment and growth on a more sustained basis, allowing better fiscal-monetary coordination.
Conclusion
Good luck in the shape of diversified sources sustaining Indian growth, give some leeway for policy errors Goyal (2009) . Positive factors include domestic demand, agriculture, openness, technology, the demographic profile, the infrastructure cycle, high savings and having crossed a critical threshold. While foreign capital does not contribute much to aggregate resources it is useful in financial intermediation and in improvements in organization. Periods of outflow have been brief. India was one of the few economies continuing to grow even as most economies contracted in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The country may have crossed a critical threshold in its transitional catch-up phase of growth.
Good management was evident in some flexibility of exchange rates, reserve accumulation in response to volatile inflows, the strategy of graded restrictions on the capital account, steady market, institutional and regulatory development, countercyclical prudential regulations, improvements in tax administration and the enactment of the FRBM. All these helped India side-step crises, and achieve respectable growth despite financial turbulence.
So India's good performance was due to good luck and to good management. The inherent strengths of the economy helped absorb both policy mistakes and external shocks. Our policy strategy did contribute, but it was arrived at by fluke and did less than it could have, precisely because it was not properly understood or owned. It is beginning to be recognized that sequenced reforms may be a better reform strategy rather than a failure of reform.
Improvements include more forward-looking response of policy, with exchange rates contributing to smoothing of interest rates, better composition and quality of government expenditure and governance, more focused and faster development of domestic financial intermediation; all this would better adapt macroeconomic policy to the structure of the economy.
Although improvements are possible, and one can debate timing, mix, degree and direction, policy came pretty close to finding the correct combination of reforms and of caution. On the whole regulators exhibited a healthy contrarian attitude, and democratic pulls and pressures resulted in a middling through process. This has a better chance of success in EMs needing development over several fronts to achieve robust diversified growth.
